Thomas Hardy and the Value of Brains by Lyons, Sara
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Lyons, Sara  (2018) Thomas Hardy and the Value of Brains.   Victorian Literature and Culture
.    ISSN 1060-1503.    (In press)
DOI




 ABSTRACT: 7KLVDUWLFOHUHDGV7KRPDV+DUG\¶V The Woodlanders (1887) and Jude the 
Obscure (1895) as ambivalent responses to the new conception of human intelligence which 
emerged from Victorian psychology and evolutionary theory and which formed the basis of 
what I describe as the Victorian biopolitics of intelligence. Although these novels reflect 
+DUG\¶VHQGRUVHPHQWof the new biological model of intelligence, they also register his 
resistance to what many late Victorians assumed to be its corollary: that mental worth can be 
an object of scientific measurement, classification, and ranking. I suggest that the work of the 
philosopher Jacques Rancière illuminates the extent to which these novels challenge the 
scientific reification of intellectual inequality and attempt to vindicate overlooked and 




Thomas Hardy and the Value of Brains 
Sara Lyons 
 
,QRQHRIWKHPRVWFHOHEUDWHGSDVVDJHVLQ7KRPDV+DUG\¶V oeuvre, Henry Knight, the 
rationalist hero of A Pair of Blue Eyes (1873), has a dramatic reckoning with the implications 
of Darwinian science and deep geological time. Dangling off the face of a cliff, he realises he 
is eye to eye with a trilobite fossil, and this prompts him to contemplate his own mortality 
and the fragility of civilisation as if they were equivalent. Knight readily perceives himself as 
an incarnation of humanist LGHDOVDQGVRXQGHUVWDQGVWKH³GLJQLW\RIPDQ´ to be at 
stake in his predicament ² a presumption that Hardy ironises but also encourages us to take 
seriously, at least insofar as we are asked to read the situation as an allegory of humanism in 
crisis. Throughout the scene, Hardy emphasises that the evolutionary perspective on 
humanity is humiliating for a man like Knight: he is distressed not simply by an atheistic 
sense RIGHDWK¶VILQDOLW\EXWE\WKHLGHDWKDWKHZLOOEH³with the small in KLVGHDWK´ 
([emphasis mine], 209). This formulation is odd but precisely revealing. Knight experiences 
his animal status as a catastrophic form of downward mobility ² the trilobite is like an 
³XQGHUOLQJ´ who has the temerity to address him on terms of equality, and he imagines 
he will somehow continue to feel degraded by their intimacy even when he too is a fossil. In 
this state of extreme physical vulnerability, we might expect Knight to invest little value in 
 his mental capacities. In fact, his abjection makes his sense of intellectual superiority all the 
more potent: 
             
Most men who have brains know it, and few are so foolish as to disguise this fact 
from themselves or others, even though an ostentatious display may be called self-
conceit. Knight, without showing it much, knew that his intellect was above the 
average. And he thought ² he could not help thinking ² that his death would be a 
deliberate loss to earth of good material; that such an experiment in killing might have 
been practised upon some less developed life. (212) 
 
.QLJKW¶VVHQVHRIKDYLQJEHHQUHGXFHGWRWKHVDPHOevel as a trilobite, a form of 
³inteOOLJHQFH>XQ@ZRUWK\RIWKHQDPH´, paradoxically intensifies his sense of his high 
place within an exclusively KXPDQKLHUDUFK\RI³EUDLQV´. Yet this hierarchy is not really 
an alternative system of value. Knight appraises his own intelligence in evolutionary and 
thoroughly materialist terms: it is precious not because it constitutes a moral or spiritual 
dimension to his nature, nor even because it will deliver concrete benefits to humanity 
(Knight is a critic and something of a GLOHWWDQWHEXWEHFDXVHLWLV³JRRGPDWHULDO´, more 
ZRUWKSUHVHUYLQJWKDQRWKHU³OHVVGHYHORSHG´ forms of life. Hardy here allegorises not only 
the high Victorian struggle to ³ILQGDVFDOHIRUWKHKXPDQ´ in the vastness of Darwinian 
evolution, but also anticipates how that struggle would generate eugenicist modes of logic in 
the final decades of the century.i  
 Strikingly, Knight finds the eugenicist perspective on his death consoling: it restores 
some of the pride that evolutionary thinking has cost him. Likewise, he appears to find it 
gratifying to conceptualise himself in statistical terms: his death will be especially regrettable 
EHFDXVHKLVEUDLQVDUH³above averagH´. Although Hardy encourages us to pardon Knight for 
 being conscious of his mental gifts, he suggests there is something WUDQVJUHVVLYHLQ.QLJKW¶V
train of thought when KHZULWHVWKDW.QLJKW³FRXOGQRWKHOSWKLQNLQJ´ of his death as an 
exceptional tragedy.  There is a troubling YDJXHQHVVWRWKHSKUDVH³VRPHOHVVGHYHORSHGOLIH´: 
does Knight simply WKLQNLWZRXOGEHEHWWHULID³]RRSK\WH´³PROOXVF´RU³VKHOO-ILVK´ died in 
his place (209), or also that it would be better if a human being of lesser intelligence did? 
And better according to what calculus? Although I have described .QLJKW¶Vlogic as 
³HXJHQLFLVW´its ultimate rationale is unclear: WKH³HDUWK´ itself seems to the only potential 
loser or beneficiar\LQUHODWLRQWRKLVVXUYLYDO³(DUWK´DUJXDEO\VXJJHVWV³KXPDQLW\´ in this 
FRQWH[WEXW+DUG\¶VFKRLFHRIWKLVZRUGLV surely deliberate, since it is able to 
convey materiality and abstraction at once: it implies that Knight, having come to understand 
his own intelligence in scientific terms, cannot see what meaning it might have except as 
organic matter, or in relation to planetary processes. 
.QLJKW¶VHYDOXDWLRQRIKLVRZQbrains on the cliff face in A Pair of Blue Eyes reflects 
+DUG\¶Vsensitivity to the implications of the new conception of human intelligence that was 
first theorised in the works of mid-Victorian psychologists, most notably Herbert Spencer, 
and which would eventually culminate in the rise of intelligence testing and the notion of IQ 
(Danziger, 69-74). ,Q6SHQFHU¶VZRUN³LQWHOOLJHQFH´ is purged of any spiritual or humanist 
value; it is a thoroughly biological category, and even the most sophisticated of intellectual 
achievements are on a cRQWLQXXPZLWKDQLPDOLQVWLQFW³,QWHOOLJHQFH´ refers not to any special 
human aptitude for reason, still less to any moral or spiritual quality, but to the basic 
processes by which organisms adapt themselves more or less successfully to their 
environments (Spencer, Principles of Psychology 388-426). This novel definition of 
LQWHOOLJHQFHEHFDPHFHQWUDOWR'DUZLQ¶VWKHRU\RIHYROXWLRQE\QDtural selection as well as to 
the eugenicist thought of Francis Galton and his followers. As Kurt Danziger points out, the 
erosion of the distinction between human and animal intelligence galvanised a cultural 
 obsession with establishing the different degrees of intelligence possessed by individuals and 
groups and with articulating how these differences related to hierarchies of gender, class, and 
race. The potentially egalitarian collapse of distinctions between mind and body, reason and 
instinct, and human and animal instead ³VDQFWLILHGancient chasms between different types of 
KXPDQV´DQGushered in an unprecedented drive to measure, classify, and rank the 
³gradations´ of mental capacity (Danziger, 70). 
The roots of the intelligence test and the associated concept of meritocracy in 
nineteenth-century eugenics and Social Darwinism, particularly in the work of Galton and 
Spencer, are generally acknowledged in histories of these phenomena.ii However, the extent 
to which intelligence became a biopolitical concern in Victorian Britain is not widely 
recognised. In Michel )RXFDXOW¶VZRUN, ³biopolitics´ refers to a transformation of political 
power which took place in the nineteenth century as states attempted to harness the insights 
of the life sciences and thereby take control of the biological. In place of the old sovereign 
right ³to take life and let live´, states now assumed the prerogative WR³make live and to let 
GLH´: that is, to nurture and regulate the health of the social body (Sexuality 135-6). Foucault 
suggests that biopower emerges both through and alongside the forms of disciplinary power 
which he analysed in Discipline and Punish (1975). Where disciplinary power aims to render 
individual bodies useful and docile through techniques such as training and surveillance, 
biopower ³deals with the population as a political problem, as a problem that is at once 
scientific and political´ (Society 245). It is characterised by efforts to measure and intervene 
in processes such as birth, death, reproduction, and disease as they play out at the level of the 
collective. The population is turned into a calculable, governable object through methods 
such as demography and statistics, and the individual is subsumed under the abstract 
imperatives of WKH³VSHFLHV´, or biological health in the aggregate (Society 242). Foucault 
closely identifies biopolitics with state racism, which he characterises as an impulse to 
 fragment and stratify the human species LQWRVXSHULRUDQGLQIHULRU³UDFHV´RU³KHDOWK\´DQG
³GHJHQHUDWH´ bodies ² a logic which he suggests its reached its twentieth-century apogee in 
Nazi eugenics (Society 254-257). However, he also emphasises the more subtle or benign 
manifestations of biopower in capitalist processes and state welfare systems, and claims that 
its characteristic modus operandi is not through laws or violent force but through the pressure 
of norms (Sexuality 141 and Society 250-251). $ELRSROLWLFDOVRFLHW\LVD³QRUPDOLVLQJ
VRFLHW\´RQHLQZKLFKLQVWLWXWLRQVDQG social GLVFRXUVHV³PHDVXUHDSSUDLVHDQGKLHUDUFKLVH´
around norms and which incites people to internalise and perpetuate norms for themselves 
(Sexuality 144).  
Although Foucault remarks in passing that biopolitics is concerned with optimising 
WKH³DSWLWXGHV´of the population, he does not consider the fact that intelligence had been 
transformed into measurable, biological entity in the nineteenth century (Sexuality 141). 
Ansgar Allen has recently suggested how the notion of biopower illuminates the assumptions 
about mental capacity circulating within the state education system which evolved in Britain 
following the Education Act of 1870. In particular, Allen highlights the disturbing 
FRQWLQXLWLHVEHWZHHQ*DOWRQ¶VHXJHQLFLVWPRGHORILQWHOOLJHQFHDQGWKHrationality and 
practices of the state school system, especially in its reliance on examinations (97-125, 136-
250). Over the course of the nineteenth century, the formal written exam and procedures of 
grading and ranking pioneered at Oxford and Cambridge universities in the eighteenth 
century came to dominate academic life at those institutions while also migrating to other 
contexts, most notably the Civil Service and the expanding mass education system and its 
³scholarship ladder´.iii As Gillian Sutherland and Simon Szreter have shown, Victorian 
examination culture generated a desire to distinguish between natural ability and acquired 
knowledge, and this in turn helped to crystallise the IQ concept: that is, the notion of 
intelligence as a general, innate quality which can be objectively captured by exams 
 (Sutherland, 97-127 and Szreter, 160-173).  
*DOWRQ¶VIDVFLQDWLRQwith the capacity of exams to sort and rank people on a mass 
scale directly led to his efforts to construe intelligence in statistical terms (Galton, 6-7,19-35). 
Galton argued that intelligence levels within a population obey the statistical law of normal 
distribution, clustering densely around a norm and creating the familiar bell-shaped curve on 
a graph: nature predictably yields a preponderance of mediocrities, a relatively small 
cognitive elite, and a relatively small class of ³LGLRWVDQGLPEHFLOHV´*DOWRQ26-36). Galton 
was also responsible for popularising the notion of intelligence as a unitary, heritable trait, 
largely impervious to environmental influences. Although Galton was certainly the most 
zealous hard hereditarian of the period, his conviction that intelligence is determined by 
heredity was endorsed by Darwin and shared even by prominent psychologists and scientists 
who favoured a Lamarckian interpretation of evolution, such as Henry Maudsley, Théodule 
Ribot, and Spencer.iv The new scientific discourses emphasising the essentially fixed, 
congenital nature of intelligence began to undermine the liberal faith in the primacy of 
education and individual agenc\LQDSHUVRQ¶VVRFLDOGHVWLQ\Such faith was closely 
associated with the work of John Stuart Mill and had underwritten optimistic cultural 
narratives of social mobility in the 1850s and 1860s (Paul and Day; Meroni, 46; White). By 
the early 1880s, however, there was a mounting cultural panic about the apparent prevalence 
of mental deficiency in the population, especially in relation to the lower-class children the 
state had committed to educating (Sutherland, 5-7). The supposed physiological limits and 
risks of education were widely discussed. There was a spate of government inquiries into the 
problem of ³LQHGXFDEOH´ children; doctors entered schools to perform physical tests on 
students and classify them as being above, below, or of average mental capacity (Sutherland, 
5-24). Meanwhile, a chorus of scientists and intellectuals proclaimed that Darwinian 
evolution or modern understandings of heredity had revealed that the French and American 
 revolutionary principle RI³QDWXUDOHTXDOLW\´ was an abject fantasy: human inequality was a 
scientific fact, and it expressed itself most starkly in intellectual differences.v As T. H. 
+X[OH\SXWLW³proclaim human equality as loudly as you like, :LWOHVVZLOOVHUYHKLVEURWKHU´ 
(10).  
Hardy has often been understood as a melancholy student of late Victorian biological 
determinism, his magpie reading of contemporary science and psychology feeding his sense 
of the supremacy of the tragic in both art and life.vi Yet critical discussions of the significance 
of evolutionary and hereditarian thought in Hardy¶VZRUN have not closely scrutinised how 
these shaped his understanding of intelligence, and for this reason, have often underestimated 
how strenuously he sought to think equality after Darwin. ,QZKDWIROORZV,UHDG+DUG\¶V
The Woodlanders (1887) and Jude the Obscure (1895) through the prism of Jacques 
5DQFLqUH¶s efforts to theorise intellectual equality and the politics of the nineteenth-century 
novel.vii Rancière work celebrates and attempts to think through the extent to which 
democratic politics entail the ³mad presupposition that everyone is LQWHOOLJHQWDVDQ\RQHHOVH´ 
(Consensual Times 2). This is also the provocation at the centre of his book, The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster (1987), which recuperates the theories of the Romantic pedagogue Joseph 
Jacotot in order to critique modern conceptions of intelligence and education. In other parts 
of his work, Rancière has made bold claims for the radically egalitarian character of the 
nineteenth-century novel. He defines the novel as a ³genre without JHQUH´ (Flesh of Words 
92) which shatters the hierarchical protocols of classical literature and takes for its subject 
anyone and anything at all. In his view, the egalitarianism of the form is independent of the 
political beliefs of any given novelist and distinct from explicitly political campaigns for 
democracy or social emancipation. ³/LWHUDU\GHPRFUDF\´ inheres in the propensity of the 
novel to honour the FDSDFLW\RI³anyone whomsoever [to] experience any emotion or passion 
ZKDWVRHYHU´Lost Thread 14). He goes on: 
  
This new capacity of anyone at all to live any life at all ruins the model linking the 
organicity of the story to the separation between active and passive men, elite and 
YXOJDUVRXOV,WSURGXFHVWKLVQHZUHDO>«ZKLFKLV@WKHLQWHUODFLQJRIDPXOWLSOLFLW\
of individual experiences, the lived fabric of a world in which it is no longer possible 
to distinguish between the great souls who think, feel, dream and act and individuals 
locked in the repetition of bare life. (Lost Thread 15) 
 
The Woodlanders and Jude are pervaded by and in some ways complicit in the late 
Victorian biopolitics of intelligence. Yet they are also concerned to reveal how the 
intelligence of both major and minor characters exceeds their social positions and eludes 
modern efforts to measure and rationalise mental capacity. These novels counter the scientific 
reification of intellectual inequality in various ways: by making an egalitarian poetry out of 
the interrelations between and amongst human beings and non-human nature, a strategy 
prominent in The Woodlanders; by insisting upon the fundamentally political and contestable 
nature of judgments about mental worth, a strategy apparent in both novels; and by positing 
extreme suffering as the authentic ground of intellectual value, a strategy favoured in Jude.  
 
1. The Value of Brains in The Woodlanders 
 
In The Woodlanders, +DUG\¶VLQWHUHVWLQPHQWDOPHDVXUHPHQWLVHQFDSVXODWHGLQWKHVXESORW
involving a minor rustic character, the servant woman Grammer Oliver. The gentleman 
scientist Edred Fitzpiers contracts to SURFXUH*UDPPHU2OLYHU¶VEUDLQXSRQKHUGHDWKVRWKDW
he may dissect it and probe the mystery of its freakish, PDVFXOLQHVL]H*UDPPHU2OLYHU¶V
SHDVDQWPDWHULDOLVPLQLWLDOO\DSSHDUVFRPSDWLEOHZLWK)LW]SLHUV¶LQWHUHVWLQFUDQLRPHWU\² 
 that is, the measurement of skulls and their contents ² but her bargain soon comes to feel 
Faustian to her: she worries that the brain she was happy to treat as a commodity and 
scientific specimen may in fact be the locus of her soul (46). In context, the Grammer Oliver 
episoGHUHVRQDWHVDVDFRPLFDOOHJRU\RIWKHQRYHO¶VZLGHUFRQFHUQZLWKhow the forces of 
modernity collide with folk traditions in UXUDO(QJODQG<HW*UDPPHU2OLYHU¶VEHODWHGTXDOPV
about her soul attest not merely to the tenacity of supernatural belief among the peasantry. 
The fact Grammer Oliver sells her brain ostensibly to science but more truly to gratify the 
whim of a bored aristocrat makes the transaction appear akin to prostitution, or a peculiarly 
macabre droit de seigneur. )LW]SLHUV¶DWWHPSWWR DFTXLUH*UDPPHU¶VEUDLQLVFOHDUO\LQWHQGHG
to parallel his seduction and marriage of WKHQRYHO¶VKHURLQH*UDFH0HOEXU\LQERWKFDVHVD
lower-class woman piques the interest of an aristocratic man of science on account of the 
exceptional nature of her mind. Fitzpiers treats both women as objects of scientific curiosity 
and collection, and this establishes an imaginative link between the mental refinements Grace 
has attained througKHGXFDWLRQDQG*UDPPHU¶V³fine brain´ (109). The parallel in turn sets up 
the question of whether intelligence is primarily inborn or acquired, even as it is foregrounds 
WKHGLVWRUWLQJHIIHFWVRI)LW]SLHUV¶SRZHUUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKERWKZRPHQ upon his capacity to 
arbitrate what Galton had recently christened the ³nature/nurture´ distinction.viii  
As Stephen Jay Gould has argued, the late nineteenth-century enthusiasm for 
FUDQLRPHWU\ZDVWKHGLUHFWSUHFXUVRUWRWKHULVHRILQWHOOLJHQFHWHVWLQJDWWKHFHQWXU\¶VFORVH
Interest in measuring skulls was driven by the misconception that skull and brain size are 
reliable indices of intelligence, and the practice was central to the efforts of nineteenth-
century anthropologists to establish the intellectual inferiority of non-European peoples 
(Gould, 62-173). It motivated the accumulation of vast private and public collections of 
human skulls, since large numbers of measurements were needed to place the study of 
raciDOLVHGPHQWDOGLIIHUHQFHRQDQ³REMHFWLYH´ footing and render it amenable to statistical 
 analysis. One of the most prominent exponents of the technique, the French anatomist Paul 
Broca, also believed that it could prove the intellectual inferiority of women and the lower 
classes ² DQDVVXPSWLRQLPSOLFLWLQ)LW]SLHUV¶FXULRVLW\DERXWWKHVL]HRI*UDPPHU2OLYHU¶V
brain (Gould, 127-141). Craniometry was among the methods Galton used to measure 
intelligence in the laboratory he set up in London in 1884, and it was part of his research at 
the University of Cambridge in 1885, where he sought to correlate the exam results of 
students with their skull measurements (Gould 108; Venn).  
)LW]SLHUV¶LQWHUHVWLQFUDQLRPHWU\ marks him out as a kind of anthropologist in 
/LWWOH+LQWRFNKHVWXGLHVWKH³QDWLYHV´ and attempts to collect skulls and brain specimens 
with a presumption of intellectual detachment, though Hardy makes clear he is in fact driven 
by his narcissism DQGOLELGR-DQH%RZQDVDSWO\LGHQWLILHV)LW]SLHUV¶DVVXPSWLRQVDVDQ
illustration of the logic RI³LQWHUQDOFRORQLDOLVP´ (5, 105-112): as Foucault observed, the 
techniques of domination that European powers deployed against colonial populations often 
resurfaced as means of controlling domestic populations (Society 103). Indeed, Fitzpiers 
appears to conceive of himself as a kind of colonial administrator: he arrives determined to 
³inaugurate a new era´ of ³DGYDQFHGLGHDVDQGSUDFWLFHV´ and shows a lofty disdain for 
established beliefs, while treating the local women as his sexual chattel (93, 46). The 
villagers regard Fitzpiers as a kind of necromancer, and Hardy asks us to see that are some 
grains of truth in this perception, at least insofar as his scientific research has a pronounced 
P\VWLFDOEHQW0RUHSUHFLVHO\)LW]SLHUV¶VFLHQFHLVLQIRUPHGE\KLVLGHDOLVWPHWDSK\VLFVDQd 
such metaphysics are in his case a monstrous form of magical thinking, a refusal to believe in 
the existence of a world beyond his own desires (118). +DUG\GLVFUHGLWV)LW]SLHUV¶LQYHVWPHQW
in measuring minds both morally and epistemologically: it represents not an authentic 
curiosity about the nature of other minds, but a wish to at once possess and negate the reality 
of others. Significantly, Hardy grants Grammar Oliver herself the prerogative of critiquing 
 the theory of intelligence implicit in FLW]SLHUV¶LQWHUHVWLQFUDQLRPHWU\*UDFHenquires: ³:DV
>)LW]SLHUV@UHDOO\PDGHIRUKLJKHUWKLQJV",VKHFOHYHU"´*UDPPDU2OLYHUUHSOLHV³:HOO
QR+RZFDQKHEHFOHYHU">«@7KHVH\RXQJPHQ² they should live to my time of life, and 
WKHQWKH\¶GVHHKRZFOHYHUWKH\ZHUHDWILYHDQGWZHQW\´7KHUHLVDQHDWO\LURQLF
chiasmus here. For Grammar Oliver, apparently the superstitious rustic, intelligence is not a 
metaphysical given but thoroughly secular and empirical: it is acquired over time, through 
worldly experience. Meanwhile Fitzpiers, apparently the detached scientist, is possessed by 
the desire to fathom metaphysical essences, and ³VFDUFHO\DEOHWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQUHDOLW\
IURPIDQF\´)LW]SLHUV¶GXDOLGHQWLW\as aristocrat and scientist underscores the power of 
the modern sciences of mental measurement to legitimise ancient class distinctions. Likewise, 
)LW]SLHUV¶self-serving amalgam of idealism and materialism calls attention to the capacity of 
science to be pressed into the service of ideology. Rancière suggests that the insidious power 
of the idea of intellectual inequality lies partly in the fact that its exponents justify it on 
spiritual or material grounds according to convenience: 
 
The superior minds want neither a superiority that would be only material nor a 
spirituality that would make them the equals of their inferiors. They lay claim to the 
differences of materialists in the midst of the elevation that belongs to immateriality. 
7KH\SDLQWWKHFUDQLRVFRSLVW¶s skulls with the innate gifts of intelligence. (Ignorant 
Schoolmaster 48). 
 
This is true of Fitzpiers, whose sense of superiority is so absolute that it leads him to 
suggest to Grace that he belongs WRDGLIIHUHQW³WULEH´RU ³spHFLHV´ (161) to the laboring 
classes but who is nonetheless uncertain about whether that superiority is a gift of birth or 
education: 
  
³I dare say I am inhuman, and supercilious, and contemptibly proud of my poor old 
ramshackle family; but I do honestly confess to you that I feel as if I belonged to a 
different species from the peoplHZKRDUHZRUNLQJLQWKDW\DUG´ 
³And from me too, then. For my EORRGLVQREHWWHUWKDQWKHLUV´ 
>«@It was, indeed, a startling anomaly that this woman of the tribe without should be 
standing there beside him as his wife >«@ 
³Ah YOU²you are refined and educated into something quite diffHUHQW´ he said, 
self-assuringly. (161-2) 
 
Fitzpiers is primarily eager to establish that there are, in 5DQFLqUH¶V WHUPV³WZR
KXPDQLWLHV´RQHLQSRVVHVVLRQRIDQ³DFWLYHLQWHOOHFWXDOIDFXOW\´and capable of refined 
thoughts and grand actions, the other consigned WRWKHUHDOPRI³SDVVLYHPDWHULDOLW\´ 
(Rancière, Discontents 31-32). When Grace protests that she falls on the wrong side of the 
³VSHFLHV´ division Fitzpiers imagines, it is easy enough for him to reconfigure its terms, since 
whether the ground of the division is biology or education matters less than the maintenance 
of the division itself. 
Hardy makes clear that )LW]SLHUV¶ craniometry is a less a science than a form of 
occultism that invests unequal social relations with mystical authority. This perception is 
reinforced by the parallel Hardy establishes between craniometry and phrenology. *UDFH¶V
father is confident that she constitutes ZRUWKZKLOH³PDWHULDO´ (140) for an education because 
he has consulteGSKUHQRORJLVWVRQWKHPDWWHU³Her fortune has been told by men of science 
² ZKDWGR\RXFDOO¶HP ² SKUHQRORJLVWV´ (70). As +DUG\¶Vcharacterisation of it as form of 
fortune-telling suggests, phrenology had lost much of its scientific credibility by the second 
half of the nineteenth century, but it led a busy afterlife as form of popular entertainment and 
 folklore. In identifying phrenology with Mr. Melbury, the ambitious provincial merchant, and 
craniometry with Fitzpiers, the mystical amateur scientist, Hardy charts quite precisely the 
development of the science of mental measurement in the nineteenth century. Craniometry 
was sometimes called the ³QHZSKUHQRORJ\´ because it promised to succeed where 
phrenology had failed and decipher the secret correspondence between mental and physical 
characteristics (Wilson). However, by the fin de siècle, scientific confidence in craniometry, 
particularly in its capacity to determine intelligence, was also receding (Dickey 213-222). In 
The Woodlanders, the dubiousness of both methods of ascertaining mental worth is 
underscored by the acquisitive motives of the men who subscribe to them. Mr. 0HOEXU\¶V 
naive faith that phreQRORJ\KDVSURYHQKLVGDXJKWHU¶V natural aptitude for education is 
matched by his naive and mercenary conception of education itself: ³<RXFDQ¶W teach her 
anything new. She's been too far among the wise ones to be astonished at anything she can 
KHDUDPRQJXVIRONLQ+LQWRFN´Mr. Melbury fetishises education because he imagines 
that it confers a static, incontrovertible form of social power. In his fantasy, education is not a 
process but a property with a fixed value. This logic obviously turns education into a 
sterile, self-negating enterprise, the opposite of the humanist ideal of bildung: one gains an 
education so that one never has to learn anything new, nor ever be surprised. 
  In a quieter way, The Woodlanders articulates a disenchantment with formal 
education as complete as we find in Jude. And like that novel, The Woodlanders is a kind of 
nihilistic bildungsroman: Grace gains an education only to realise there was nothing worth 
learning; the truly valuable knowledge is the rustic wisdom she grew up among in Little 
Hintock, and the effort to extend beyond it is only self-betrayal and destruction. Hardy¶V
pessimism about education and social mobility in his last novels can seem perverse given that 
opportunities for both were expanding toward the end of the century. Nevertheless, as Jane 
Mattisson has detailed+DUG\¶Vinsistence upon the class-bound nature of the education 
 system accurately reflects the elusiveness of such opportunities as well as the elitist effects of 
meritocratic reform, which overwhelmingly favoured upper- and middle-class men (51-101). 
Beyond this, +DUG\¶VMDXQGLFHGYLHZRIHGXFDWLRQQHHGVWREHXQGHUVWRRGLQWKHFRQWH[WRI
the rise of scientific discourses of innate intelligence, which, taken to their extreme 
conclusion, could make education seem a superficial, largely diagnostic process, capable of 
measuring and classifying but not of substantially improving DSHUVRQ¶VPLQG It is this 
essentialist and deterministic understanding of intelligence that partly accounts for the 
VWDJQDQWQDWXUHRI*UDFH¶V bildung plot ² that is, the failure of her education to produce any 
significant moral or intellectual development ² as well as the motif of blighted growth that 
runs throughout the novel. For as the rest of the novel makes clear, the allegory of class and 
JHQGHUGRPLQDWLRQHQFRGHGLQ)LW]SLHUV¶SXUFKDVH RI*UDPPHU2OLYHU¶VEUDLQDSSOLHVHTXDOO\
WR*UDFHKHUEUDLQQROHVVWKDQ*UDPPHU2OLYHU¶VLVVXEMHFWWRWKHORJLFRIUHLILFDWLRQERWK
in the sense that it is a commodity to be bought and sold by men, and in the sense that her 
intelligence is conceptualised by men as essentially fixed natural endowment, only somewhat 
³UHILQHG´RU³ILQLVKHG´ by education.  
Although Mr. 0HOEXU\ERDVWVRIKLV*UDFH¶VQDWXUDOILWQHVVIRUHGXFDWLRQLWLV
important the novel never straightforwardly vindicates his paternal pride, and indeed does 
PXFKWRVXJJHVWWKDWLWLVPLVSODFHG7KHIDFWWKDW*UDFH¶VVXSSRVHGPHQWDOVXSHULRULW\LV
primarily registered in the class-conscious, reifying discourses of her father and Fitzpiers 
casts doubt on its reality; for much of the novel, it seemVWRVLJQLI\QRWKLQJPRUHWKDQ³a 
veneer of DUWLILFLDOLW\´ (186). When Grace is disillusioned by Fitzpiers, she becomes an avid 
reader, and this turn toward books seems to mark the beginning of a morally serious form of 
self-cultivation, in contrast to the spurious kind she acquired at school (309). Yet Grace 
remains a curiously flat, superficial character; Hardy never endows her with the kind of 
vibrant inner life we would expect of a bildung progatonist (nor indeed of a Hardy heroine: 
 Hardy himself apparently struggled to invest her with imaginative energy, considering her 
³WRRFRPPRQSODFHDQGVWUDLWODFHG´WREHFDSDEOHRIUHDOSDVVLRQRUZRUWK\RID³ILQHWUDJLF
HQGLQJ´ [Qtd. Dutta 88]). At thHQRYHO¶V HQG+DUG\UHGXFHV*UDFH¶V interiority to a homily: 
she comes to learn ³how little accomplishments and culture weigh beside sterling personal 
FKDUDFWHU´ (301). Hardy even limits the extent to which Grace is permitted to gain tragic 
depth in the aftermath of her moral awakening, since it leads only to further 
compromise: after Giles Winterborne has sacrificed his life for her, she reconciles herself to a 
debased marriage with Fitzpiers, and the grandeur and SDWKRVRIWKHQRYHO¶V tragic conclusion 
is instead conferred upon the peasant girl who loved Giles unrequitedly, Marty South.  
On the most obvious level, this aggrandisement RIWKHQRYHO¶V rustic characters at the 
expense of their educated counterparts reaffirms old moralistic understandings of the 
intellect. As Lorraine Daston notes, the Victorian psychologists and scientists never fully 
succeeded in detaching the category of ³intelligence´ from its freight of moral and 
religious meanings (212). Such meanings are woven into the romance fabric of The 
Woodlanders: )LW]SLHUV¶VRSKLVWLFDWLRQ marks him out as a devil or Faust archetype, while 
*LOHV¶simplicity reflects his status a *UHHQ0DQ&KULVWILJXUH*UDFH¶V education is the 
cause of her fall into class consciousness and treachery to Giles, whereas Marty the peasant 
girl is defined by her sublime fidelity WRKLP<HWWKHQRYHO¶s engagement with the new 
scientific conception of intelligence goes beyond simple moral rejection. It is in fact +DUG\¶V
endorsement of a thoroughly biological and evolutionary model of intelligence that underpins 
both the QRYHO¶V egalitarian politics and its moral vision. 
Throughout The Woodlanders, Hardy contests the idea that social class is a simple 
HPDQDWLRQRIPHQWDOZRUWK7KLVDQFLHQWSUHMXGLFHKDGJDLQHGIUHVKSUHVWLJHIURP*DOWRQ¶V
HXJHQLFVDVZHOODVIURP6SHQFHU¶V6RFLDO'DUZLQLVPERWKof which suggested that social 
hierarchies reflect underlying biological differences, and that social position is a relatively 
 transparent signifier of intelligence. The Woodlanders contests this assumption at the basic 
OHYHORISORWWKHQDUUDWLYHVSULQJVIURP*HRUJHDQG*UDFH0HOEXU\¶VIDLOXUHWRGLVWLQJXLVh 
between social position and inner qualities. Crucially, this is not simply a failure to hold 
*LOHV¶VPRUDOJRRGQHVVDWLWVSURSHUYDOXHLWLVDIDLOXUHWRUHFRJQLVHWKHSURIXQGLW\RIKLV
intelligence. Where Hardy ironises the highly abstract and mysticaOQDWXUHRI)LW]SLHUV¶
LQWHOOHFWXDOSXUVXLWVKHHPSKDVLVHVWKHHPERGLHGLQWHOOLJHQFHHQWDLOHGE\*LOHV¶DJULFXOWXUDO
ZRUN)LW]SLHUV¶LQWHOOHFWXDOLW\LVDIRUPRIVROLSVLVPWKDWUHQGHUVKLPQRWMXVWPRUDOO\
callous, but stupid about basic empirical realities ² a fact symbolised by the episode where 
he mounts the wrong horse, drifts asleep while riding, falls on his head, and then drunkenly 
UHYHDOVKLVVH[XDOLQILGHOLWLHVWR*UDFH¶VIDWKHU)LW]SLHUV¶GHVLUHWRDEVWUDFWKLPVHOIfrom the 
natural world througK³WUDQVFHQGHQWDOSKLORVRSK\´ (119) renders him much more vulnerable 
to bodily, instinctual impulses than Giles, whose acceptance of his interconnection with 
nature enables him to transcend such impulses ² DSDUDGR[FDSWXUHGDWWKHQRYHO¶VFORVH
when he dies exposed to the elements rather than give way to sexual temptation with Grace. 
In this way, the novel schematically inverts the values conventionally ascribed to physical 
and mental labor, lower- and upper-class men: where Giles exemplifies introspection and 
³VFUXSXORXVGHOLFDF\´ (282), Fitzpiers is prey to his grossest instincts and appetites. 
 +DUG\¶VHPSKDVLVXSRQWKH³intelligen[ce]´ PDQLIHVWHGLQ*LOHV¶³intercourse with 
nDWXUH´ (297) extends to Marty too. It is in relation to her that the novel makes its most 
explicit statement about the arbitrariness of social class: 
 
As with so many right hands born to manual labor, there was nothing in its 
fundamental shape to bear out the physiological conventionalism that gradations of 
birth show themselves primarily in the form of this member. Nothing but a cast of die 
of Destiny had decided that the girl should handle the tool; and the fingers which 
 clasped the heavy ash haft might have skilfully guided the pencil or swept the string, 
had they only been set to do it in good time. (10) 
 
7KHSXUSRVHRIWKLVSDVVDJHLVWRHVWDEOLVK0DUW\¶VQDWXUDOHTXDOLW\ZLWK*UDFHQRWWR
lament that Marty has been denied opportunities for more refined occupations: as the rest of 
the novel makes clear, education and social mRELOLW\DUHDWEHVWPL[HGEOHVVLQJV*UDFH¶V
IDLOXUHWRDSSUHFLDWH*LOHV¶ORYHXQWLOWRRODWHLVGXSOLFDWHGLQ*LOHV¶IDLOXUHWRKROG0DUW\¶V
love at its proper value, and the pathos of this latter tragedy is amplified by the fact that it is 
repeated at thHOHYHORIWKHQRYHO¶VGLVWULEXWLRQRIQDUUDWLYHDWWHQWLRQ$V$OH[:RORFKKDV
argued, nineteenth-century novels often register the pressures of expanding democracy and 
social inequality by problematising the distinction between major and minor characters and 
the relative narrative attention accorded to each (30-32). In the case of The Woodlanders, 
+DUG\HQFRXUDJHVXVWRUHJUHWWKDW*UDFHUDWKHUWKDQ0DUW\LVWKHQRYHO¶VKHURLQHRUDWOHDVW
to recognise that Marty has equal claim upon the role. The wistful passage quoted above 
VHUYHVWRXQGHUVFRUHWKDW*UDFH¶VVWDWXVDVKHURLQHLVDVDUELWUDU\DVKHUDFTXLVLWLRQRI
education and social mobility; she does not possess any particular mental qualities that 
elevate her above Marty. The fact WKDWWKHQRYHO¶VFRQFOXVLRQIRFXVHVRQWKHWUDJHG\RI
0DUW\¶VXQUHTXLWHGORYHDQGVKHXWWHUVWKHQRYHO¶VILQDOZRUGVIXUWKHUXQGHUVFRUHVKHUVWDWXV
QRWRQO\DV*LOHV¶PLJKW-have-EHHQZLIHEXWDVWKHQRYHO¶VPLJKW-have-been heroine.  
In its focus on the overlooked intelligence of Marty and Giles, The Woodlanders 
disrupts what Rancière FDOOVWKH³SROLFH´ distribution of the sensible ² that is, the 
hierarchical, totalising account of society which presumes WKDWDSHUVRQ¶VLQWHOOHFWXDOcapacity 
is aligned with his or her social identity and which prescribes what a person is able to feel, 
say, and do. In his efforts to make 0DUW\¶VDQG*LOHV¶V intelligence perceptible, Hardy enacts, 
in 5DQFLqUH¶VWHUPVD³FRXQWRIWKHXQFRXQWHG´ ² he ³VSRLOVWKHILWEHWZHHQERGLHVDQG
 PHDQLQJV´DQGWKHUHE\exposes the contingency of the police order (Politics, 41). The 
confidence with which Hardy undermines distinctions between mental and physical labor, 
intellect and instinct in The Woodlanders is surely drawn in part from his reading of Darwin 
and Spencer.ix In The Principles of Psychology (1855), Spencer argued that ³WKHFRPPRQO\
assumed hiatus EHWZHHQ5HDVRQDQG,QVWLQFWKDVQRH[LVWHQFH>«@7KHJURZWKRILQWHOOLJHQFH
LVWKURXJKRXWGHWHUPLQHGE\WKHUHSHWLWLRQRIH[SHULHQFH´Darwin famously contends 
that much of what appears merely instinctual in animals can in fact be considered a form of 
reason, and that human reason must be understood as an adaptive development from such 
rudimentary acts (Darwin 2004, 86). However, where in Darwin and Spencer this perception 
of the organic, adaptive nature of intelligence sharpens the significance of the relative 
amounts of it possessed by individuals and groups (Danziger 68-71), Hardy uses it in The 
Woodlanders to challenge the legitimacy of conventional social judgments about mental 
capacities. In particular, the novel refutes what Rancière FDOOVWKH³opposition between the 
golden race and the iron race, any hierarchy ² even an inverted one ² between men devoted 
to manual work and men destLQHGWRWKHH[HUFLVHRIWKRXJKW´Ignorant Schoolmaster 37). 
Ventriloquising Jacotot, Rancière emphasises that intellectual emancipation consists not in 
³RSSRVLQJmanual knowledge, the knowledge of the people, the intelligence of the tool to the 
science of schooOVRUWKHUKHWRULFRIWKHHOLWH´, but in recognising that there  
 
are not two levels of intelligence, that any human work of art is the practice of the 
same intellectual potential. In all cases, it is a question of observing, comparing, and 
combining, of making anGQRWLFLQJKRZRQHKDVGRQHLW>«@7KHIDEULFDWLRQRIFORXGV
is a human work of art that demands as much ² neither more nor less ² labor and 
intellectual attention as the fabrication of shoes or locks. (Ignorant Schoolmaster 36-
7)  
  
+DUG\¶VORYLQJDWWHQWLRQWRWKHSDUWLFXODUVRI0DUW\¶VPDQXDOODERr leads us to feel 
that her work cannot be understood as a mere waste of her mental capacities, harsh and 
socially degrading though it may be. Describing her making spars for thatching, Hardy 
highlights that her labor is mental as well as physical, demanding QRWMXVW³GH[WHURXV´ hands 
EXW³FULWLFDO´ attention (9). 6LPLODUO\+DUG\HPSKDVLVHVWKDW*LOHV¶DQG0DUW\¶VNQRZOHGJH
of the woodlands constitutes a sophisticated form of expertise. Where the novel deflates 
FitzpierV¶SUHWHQVLRQVWRHVRWHULF NQRZOHGJHLWVXJJHVWVWKDW*LOHV¶VDQG0DUW\KDYH
authentically deep insight into the nature of things ² a kind of literacy in the language of the 
woods. This is not because the novel romanticises instinctual, embodied wisdom at the 
expense of scientific knowledge; rather, it aims to break down such distinctions.  
0DUW\¶VDQG*LOHV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHZRRGVLVVRSURIound that it appears instinctual and 
even magical to Grace, but it is in fact the product of patiently accumulated observation and 
experiment ² a means of knowing that proceeds by the same principles as FitzpLHUV¶VWXG\RI
brain tissue: 
  
The casual glimpses which the ordinary population bestowed upon that wondrous 
world of sap and leaves called the Hintock woods had been with these two, Giles and 
Marty, a clear gaze. They had been possessed of its finer mysteries as of 
commonplace knowledge; had been able to read its hieroglyphs as ordinary writing; 
WRWKHPWKHVLJKWVDQGVRXQGV>«@ZKLFKKDGWR*UDFHDWRXFKRIWKHXQFDQQ\DQG
even the supernatural, were simple occurrences whose origin, continuance, and laws 
WKH\IRUHNQHZ>«@WRJHWKHUWKH\KDGZLWKWKHUXQRIWKH\HDUVPHQWDOO\FROOHFWHG
those remoter signs and symbols, which seen in few, were of runic obscurity, but all 
together made an alphabet. (297-8) 
  
The ecological vision articulated in passages such as this also offers a critique of the  
the late Victorian preoccupation with classifying and quantifying mental differences. As John 
Heaney argues, The Woodlanders marks a VKLIWLQ+DUG\¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUG'DUZLQLDQ
evolution (518).H\SDVVDJHVLQ+DUG\¶Vearlier novels, the cliff scene in A Pair of Blue Eyes 
perhaps most famous among them, depict evolutionary monism as a devastating blow to 
human dignity and happiness. However, in The Woodlanders, the collapse of the distinction 
between humanity and nature, while still clearly tragic, no longer resonates as a mere 
degradation or loss of meaning; instead, the novel finds nobility and enchantment in the 
thoroughly organic nature of the human0RVWVWULNLQJO\WKHQRYHO¶VFKDUDFWHUVDUH
persistently likened to trees, and this analogy enables Hardy to cast the human desire for 
flourishing in lushly poetic terms, as a beautiful urge toward growth. William Cohen captures 
WKLVDSWO\ZKHQKHQRWHVWKDWWKHQRYHO¶VFKDUDFWHUVDUHIUHTXHQWO\LPDJLQHGDV³rooted, 
budding, leafy DQGDEORRP´ (9). This is not to suggest that the Hardy retreats to a pre-
Darwinian pastoralism; he is careful to emphasise that trees, no less than animals and 
humans, are engaged in a struggle for existence pervaded by conflict and waste.x 
Nonetheless, +DUG\¶VLQVLVWHQFHXSRQWKH³arboreality´ RIWKHKXPDQWRERUURZ&RKHQ¶V
phrase, enables him to conduct an immanent critique of the hierarchical conception of human 
intelligence which emerged from Victorian physiological psychology and evolutionary theory 
(Cohen, 17). In The Woodlanders, the perception that human intelligence is a wholly natural 
phenomenon, subject to the same processes of adaptation as animal and plant life, does not 
serve to validate human forms of competition and hierarchy as it does in the writings of 
Spencer and Galton; rather, it serves to make human differences, particularly those 
entrenched by class, appear negligible, a narcissism of small differences. If human 
intelligence is produced by same adaptive processes as the growth of trees, what do mental 
 YDULDWLRQVEHWZHHQKXPDQVUHDOO\VLJQLI\")LW]SLHUV¶FRQYLFWLRQthat he belongs to a different 
³VSHFLHV´ to the laboULQJFODVVHVLVUHQGHUHGDEVXUGE\WKHQRYHO¶VHFRORJLFDOYLVLRQZKLFK
dwarfs human categories and distinctions.  
7KHIHOLFLW\RI+DUG\¶V analogies between humans and trees in The Woodlanders 
often hinges upon the idea of silviculture, and thereby highlights not only the naturalistic 
status of human beings but human agency in interaction with non-human nature. Crucially, 
the metaphor of silviculture underscores that humans have the power to tend or damage one 
DQRWKHU¶VQDWXUDOGHYHORSPHQW*LOHV¶HPSDWKLFLQWHOOLJHQFHLVV\PEROLVHGE\KLV³marvellous 
SRZHURIPDNLQJWUHHVJURZ´ (58)ZKLOH)LW]SLHUV¶DUURJDQFHLVevident in his destruction of 
the elm that John South fancies is linked to his mortality. We are invited to perceive the 
connection between Mr. 0HOEXU\¶VUHLILFDWLRQRIKLVGDXJKWHU¶VLQWHOOLJHQFHDVDFRPPRGLW\
on the marriage market and his business as a timber merchant. Fred Reid suggests that such 
silviculture metaphors derive froP+DUG\¶VUHDGLQJRIWKH³,QGLYLGXDOLVP´ chapter of John 
Stuart 0LOO¶VOn Liberty (1859), in which MiOOZULWHVWKDWKXPDQQDWXUHLV³not a machine to 
be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which 
requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward 
forces ZKLFKPDNHLWDOLYLQJWKLQJ´ (Mill, 66; and Reid, 190). Mill was here drawing upon 
:LOKHOPYRQ+XPEROGW¶VRUJDQLFLVWFRQFHSWRIbildung, and making a larger argument for an 
HGXFDWLRQV\VWHPWKDWZRXOGQXUWXUHLQGLYLGXDOLVPUDWKHUWKDQFRQIRUPLW\*UDFH¶V
experience of formal education has stifled any such holistic or personal mode of self-
GHYHORSPHQW³&XOWLYDWLRQKDGVRIDUDGYDQFHGLQWKHVRLORI0LVV0HOEXU\¶VPLQGDVWROHDG
her to talk of anything save of that she knew well, and had the greatest interest in developing: 
KHUVHOI´40). Yet a Romantic ideal of bildung SHUVLVWVDWWKHOHYHORIWKHQRYHO¶VDUERUHDO
imagery and metaphors, suggesting that a richer and more enlightened conception of human 
flourishing is imaginable even if the potentialities of Grace, Marty, and Giles have been 
 tragically undercut. In its vision of human nature as a dynamic living thing, treelike in both 
its capacity for growth and its susceptibility to damage, The Woodlanders attempts to counter 
the reification of intelligence as a fixed, measurable entity. The novel is thus not a simple 
5RPDQWLFODPHQWWKDW³Nature has lost its soul to modern VFLHQFH´, as Mary Jacobus has it 
(117). It is precisely in and WKURXJK+DUG\¶VDFFHSWDQFHRIDELRORJLFDODQGHYROXWLRQDU\
understanding of intelligence that he is able to preserve a Romantic sense of the 
immeasurability of minds. 
 
2. µ,+DYH8QGHUVWDQGLQJDV:HOODV<RX¶,QWHOOHFWXDO(TXDOLW\DQGJude the 
Obscure  
 
The title of Jude the Obscure when it first appeared in serial form was The Simpletons, but 
+DUG\FKDQJHGLWZKHQVRPHRQHSRLQWHGRXWWKHVLPLODULW\WR&KDUOHV5HDG¶VQRYHOThe 
Simpleton (Marroni 163). At first glance, the original title evokes the thread of the novel 
which romanticises Jude Fawley and Sue Bridehead as visionary innocents, too idealistic to 
DGDSWWKHPVHOYHVWRWKHFUXHOWLHVRIVRFLHW\RUQDWXUH+RZHYHULWDOVRSRLQWVWRWKHQRYHO¶V
iconoclastic stance toward late Victorian concepts of intelligence and intellectual value. That 
+DUG\PHDQW³VLPSOHWRQ´ to carry a dissident charge is also indicated by his subsequent 
choices of title: Hearts Insurgent and The Recalcitrants (Marroni 163). By the fin de siècle, 
there was a deepening tendency to biologise the problems of poverty and criminality, and a 
related preoccupation with the ubiquity of ³IHHEOH-PLQGHGQHVV´DPRQJWKHSRRUDVQRWHG
concern focussed with particular intensity upon the poor children newly in receipt of state 
education.xi In WKLVFRQWH[W+DUG\¶VVHQVHWKDWKLVSURWDJRQLVWVPD\EHFODVVLILHd fluidly ² if 
ironically ² DV³VLPSOHWRQV´³LQVXUJHQWV´RU³UHFDOFLWUDQWs´ is suggestive: it reflects his 
desire to position his novel as an incendiary if in some ways ambiguous intervention in the 
 contemporary politics of mental ability. 
$OWKRXJK0DUMRULH*DUEHUVXJJHVWVWKDW-XGHLVGRRPHGE\KLV³ORJRFHQWULF
ZLVWIXOQHVV´DQGIHWLVKLVDWLRQRIOLWHUDWXUHKHLQLWLDOO\feels a bitter enmity toward books 
(154). It LVDERRN¶VSRZHUWRLQFXOFDWHDVHQVHRIPHQWDOLQIHULRULW\WKDWILUVWSURYRNes 
explicitly suicidal feelings in the child Jude. Despairing of his capacity to teach himself 
Greek and Latin from an old grammar book, he concludes: 
  
7KHUHZHUHQREUDLQVLQKLVKHDGHTXDOWRWKLVEXVLQHVVDQG>«@KHZLVKHGKHKDG
never seen a book, that he might never see another, that he had never been born. 
6RPHERG\PLJKWKDYHFRPHDORQJWKDWZD\ZKR>«@PLJKWKDYHFKHHUHGKLPE\
saying that his notions were further advanced than those of his grammarian. But 
nobody did come, because nobody does; and under the crushing recognition of his 
gigantic error Jude continued to wish himself out of the world. (33) 
 
Jude¶VFRQWUDGLFWRU\VWDWXVDVDWRQFHWKH³quintessentiaOELRSROLWLFDOQRYHO´ and as a  
a lacerating critique of the late Victorian biopolitics of intelligence is submerged in this 
passage.xii 2QWKHRQHKDQGWKHQRYHOLQYLWHVXVWRLQWHUSUHWWKH\RXQJ-XGH¶VVXLFLGHLGHDWLRQ
as a symptom of hLVGHJHQHUDF\DQG³XQILWQHVV´for the disciplines of education and social 
advancement, a degeneracy which is inherited by Father Time, his suicidal/fratricidal son.xiii 
2QWKHRWKHU-XGH¶VGHVSDLULVDOVRLQVHSDUDEOHIURPWKHQRYHO¶VSROLWLFDOUDJHZKLFKLV
directed at the class and religious ideologies which convince Jude of the inferiority of his 
brains. The novel bears witnHVVWRWKHWUXWKRI5DQFLqUH¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDW³what stultifies the 
common people is not their lack of instruction, but the belief in the inferiority of their 
LQWHOOLJHQFH´(Ignorant Schoolmaster 39). Like The Woodlanders, Jude assails the idea that 
there are ³WZRKXPDQLWLHV´RU³WZRlevels of intelligence´, but in Jude this is above all an 
 indictment of what we are encouraged to understand as the Victorian class theology of 
intelligence, WKHGLYLVLRQRIWKHZRUOGLQWR³thoughtful and mentally sKLQLQJRQHV´ (22) and 
WKH³GHVSDLULQJZRUWKOHVV´.  
Rancière observes that the transformative encounter with a book is a stock novelistic 
trope which assumed a special place in nineteenth-centuU\ZRUNHU¶VOLWHUDWXUH,QVXFK
literature, the encounter with a book serves to allegorise how a child of the laboring classes is 
initiated into OLWHUDF\DQGWKHUHE\LQWR³DQRWKHUGHVWLQ\´Mute Speech 90). Rancière notes 
that the same topos also surfaces in reactionary form in novels produced by nineteenth-
century litterateurs alarmed by ³the iQYDVLRQRIWKHWHPSOHRIDUW´Mute Speech 90). In the 
reactionary version, the working-class FKLOG¶Vencounter with a book is the ³ZRUNRIGHDWK´
the child is infected with impossible fantasies of social mobility and ultimately succumbs to 
criminality or despair, thereby illustrating the fatality of mass literacy (Mute Speech 90). 
-XGH¶VVXLFLGDOPLVHU\ over the grammar book is open to being read in this way: the 
discovery of the world of learning is for him not the start of a process of self-development but 
the seeds of self-GHVWUXFWLRQ+RZHYHU+DUG\¶VHDJHUQHVVto demystify the labor involved in 
literacy circumvents the conservative cautionary-tale reading RI-XGH¶Vintellectual ambition. 
The initiation scene dramatises QRW-XGH¶VXQILWQHVVIRUeducation but instead clarifies how 
easily and early the intellect of a child may be stultified. The young Jude understands 
learning in quasi-supernatural termsDVDIRUPRIDOFKHP\LQKLV³LQQRFHQFH´KHIDQFLHVWKDW
WKHUHLVD³law of transmutDWLRQ´ which enables Latin and Greek to be converted into English, 
and is demoralised when he realises that languages must be acquired at WKHFRVWRI³\HDUVRI
SORGGLQJ´. Jude takes the discovery that education is a form of labor as a symptom of his 
personal unworthiness, a reflection of his status as a member of the laboring classes (30). As 
the rest of the novel makes clear, however, this conception of education as a magical 
transmutation is far from being an ³LQQRFHQW´ FKLOG¶VIDQF\LWLVDQLGHRORJ\E\ZKLFK
 Victorian class inequality is maintained, and Jude remains enthralled by it as an adult. Jude 
imagines Oxford (called Christminster in the novel) as a city of celestial luminosity, and 
those who attend it as ethereal beings³PHQWDOO\VKLQLQJRQHV´; although he becomes a 
conscientious autodidact, he remains tantalised by the notion that learning ought to be 
experienced as pure transcendence, not merely leisured but disembodied and out of time. 
Jude does come to recognise how his own labor, both imaginative and physical (he finds 
employment in Oxford as a stonemason), has served to fortify the illusion of a city devoted to 
pure spirit ² an insight that the narrator calls a ³WUXHLOOXPLQDWLRQ´ (84). But this 
HQOLJKWHQPHQWLVRQO\³PRPHQW>DU\@´; Jude FRQWLQXHVWR³ORYH´Oxford even when he 
UHFRJQLVHVWKDWLW³KDWHVDOOPHQOLNHPH´DQGdespises the ³ODERUHGDFTXLVLWLRQV´RIWKH³VHOI-
WDXJKW´ (320). The real lesson of the grammar book ² thDWDOO³DFTXLVLWLRQV´DUH³ODERUHG´
² is never truly learnt by Jude, though the narrator insistently foregrounds it for the reader.xiv  
As Jonathan Memel has shown, +DUG\¶V-XGHKDVEHHQDQDELGLQJWRXFKVWRQHLQ
modern debates about class and education in Britain, his name invoked to convey the pathos 
of the bright working-class boy denied opportunity. Yet this cultural myth of Jude falsifies 
the novel in crucial respects. The novel is actually an attack on the archetype of the poor boy 
of promise, the exceptional child who is entitled to climb the scholarship ladder from 
REVFXULW\WRWKH³SDUDGLVHRIWKHOHDUQHG´. Critics routinely characterise Jude as 
³EULJKW´, ³WDOHQWHG´ RU³LQWHOOLJHQW´, but WKHQDUUDWRUQHYHUSDVVHVMXGJPHQWRQ-XGH¶VPHQWDO
ability and no other character in the novel credits him with particular intellectual gifts; Sue 
believes he ought to be admitted to Oxford RQWKHJURXQGVRIKLV³SDVVLRQ IRUOHDUQLQJ´ (151), 
not because of any kind of innate intelligence.xv  Jude himself doubts that has sufficient 
³EULOOLDQ>FH@´DQG³QDWXUDODELOLW\´to win a scholarship (115). In Tess RIWKHG¶8rbervilles 
(1891), Hardy freely availed himself of contemporary discourses of innate intelligence to 
vindicate the worth of his heroine; the fact that he refrains from doing the same for Jude is 
 important.xvi After all, if Jude were presented as an unequivocally gifted young man, this 
would presumably serve to intensify the sense of injustice that attaches to his exclusion from 
university. Instead, however, the novel is a thornier provocation: it is the tragedy of an 
unexceptional poor boy who desperately wants to go to Oxford; more, it is the tragedy of a 
poor boy who becomes obsessed with the dream of Oxford precisely because he does not 
EHOLHYHKHKDVWKH³EUDLQV´ to go.  
In a review of Jude, Edmund Gosse GHULGHG+DUG\¶VDSSDUHQWLPSOLFDWLRQWKDW-XGH
had to right to an Oxford fellowship and diagnoVHG-XGHZLWK³GHJHQHUDF\´ and 
³PHJDORPDQLD´ although he is also decided WKDW-XGHVKRZHG³EULJKWQHVV´DQGPLJKWKDYH
³EHFRPHIDLUO\GLVWLQJXLVKHGDVDVFKRODU´ (64-65)*RVVH¶VUHYLHZLOOXPLQDWHVWKHH[WHQWWR
which medical and pedagogical judgments had begun to shade into one another at the fin de 
siècle. Gosse responds to the novel as if it were a kind of psychometric test, inviting us to 
sFUXWLQLVH-XGH¶Vmental fitness and thereby determine his eligibility for a scholarship. As 
Shuman has suggested, nineteenth century novelists were often self-conscious about the 
analogy between the realist novel and the examination: both forms purported to make 
nebulous mental qualities available for just evaluation (88-89). Although modern readers tend 
to appraise Jude more sympathetically than Gosse does, they nevertheless often share his 
LPSXOVHWRDVVHVV-XGH¶Vworth as a university candidate.xvii 7KHQRYHO¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQLQWKH
late Victorian politics of education is both more radical and more ambiguous than such 
readings register. Jude is kind of anti-scholarship examination, laying bare all social and 
psychological forces which conspire to make JXGH¶VODWHQWLQWHOOHFWXDOFDSDFLWLHVXQNQRZDEOH 
and his desire to go to Oxford utterly masochistic. In this, Hard\¶VFRQWHVWVWKHLGHDWKDWWKH
³natural abiOLW\´ of a poor boy like Jude is discoverable, whether by competitive examination, 
social judgment, or even by the omniscience of a realist novelist. As I have argued elsewhere 
in relation WR+HQU\-DPHV¶VThe Tragic Muse (1890), such narratorial agnosticism about the 
 intellectual gifts of a bildung protagonist ought to be understood as an attempt to resist the 
contemporary impetus to assess and measure intelligence (Lyons).  
Jude highlights the extent to which the sentimental myth of the poor boy of talent was 
a subset of the larger political distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor. This 
distinction, concretised in Victorian culture by the New Poor Law of 1834 and implicit in 
much Victorian philanthropy, divided the poor into innocent victims entitled to charity and 
malefactors who required moral discipline or were simply beyond redemption (Romano 13-
29). As Gosse confused assessment of Jude¶Vmental worth registers, his character is 
precisely constructed to confound this distinction. To a marked degree, Jude is the delinquent 
twin of the deserving scholarship boy: not only does he lack the requisite ³brilliance´, he 
drinks too much, cannot contain his sexuality, and is given to bouts of iconoclastic rage. He 
also shows symptoms of hereditary degeneracy, though as in Tess, heredity is treated more as 
a matter of folk superstition and class prejudice than of natural law in Jude.xviii On the other 
hand, Jude is a paragon of the ³UHVSHFWDEOH´poor insofar as he embodies the earnest 
commitment to hard work associated with Samuel Smiles and the mid-Victorian culture of 
self-help. However, +DUG\HQVXUHVWKDW-XGH¶V commitment to his ambition registers not as 
virtuous Smilesian persistence but as a disturbing form of perseveration: in effect, Jude 
compulsively re-enacts the childhood trauma of his encounter with the grammar book and the 
annihilating self-hatred it induced. For this reason, the novel has been rightly understood as 
an indictment of the Smilesian model of social mobility, with the case of Jude demonstrating 
that no amount of individual striving suffices to overcome systemic oppression.xix Yet it is 
more accurate to say that the novel captures how the mid-Victorian model of self-help could 
produce a devastating kind of cognitive dissonance when it became entangled with fin de 
siècle scientific determinism about intelligence. Despite their obvious incompatibility, Jude is 
the victim of both ideologies, afflicted on the one hand by the egalitarian promise of agency 
 and moral reward held out by the Smilesian ideal and by the sense of fatalism purveyed by 
late Victorian discourses about heredity and brains.  
As Simon Szreter notes, the late 9LFWRULDQ³scholarship ladder´ZDV³DQDOPRVW
VSHFWUDOWRNHQLVP´; in 1900, fewer than one in a thousand elementary school children were 
given assistance to attend the grade schools which could make university entry feasible (165).  
Nonetheless, Jude attests to the capacity of such fugitive meritocratic opportunity to possess 
the imagination. It is also attests to the ambiguous political implications of the scholarship 
ladder: while it could be understood as a democratic extension of educational opportunity, it 
could also convey the idea that mental ability is extremely rare among the poor. The Taunton 
Commissioners (1864-7) who were charged with reforming the grammar school system 
sought to create a scholarship cRPSHWLWLRQWKDWZRXOGLGHQWLI\³ER\VRIH[FHSWLRQDOWDOHQW´ by 
³natural VHOHFWLRQ´, as if exam performance were a proxy for evolutionary fitness. The Bryce 
Commission, an 1895 inquiry into secondary education in England, similarly recommended 
that scholarships be awarded to impoverished ³boys of UDUHFDSDFLW\´ (Qtd. Wooldridge, 173-
174). Where in Tess Hardy finesses the distinction between the exceptional and the ordinary 
in order to DJJUDQGLVHDQGXQLYHUVDOLVHKLVKHURLQH¶VWUDJHG\ by turns, in Jude, there is a more 
leaden emphasis upon the hero¶VRUGLQDULQHVVAs Emily Steinlight observes, Jude is always 
glimpsing himseOI³LQWKHPLUURURIVWDWLVWLFV´: he is dispirited by the thought that there 
DUH³thousands of young men on the same self-VHHNLQJWUDFN´ as himself. Interestingly, 
Sue, who does not conflate intellectual self-worth and social distinction as Jude does, is 
nonetheless haunted by the same sense that she is nothing special: she can take no pleasure in 
being consLGHUHG³DFOHYHUJLUO´ EHFDXVH³therHDUHWRRPDQ\RIWKDWVRUWQRZ´. This 
consciousness of RQH¶Vstatistical mediocrity, of there beLQJ³WRRPDQ\´ other people of the 
VDPHDYHUDJHW\SHDVRQHVHOIOLHVDWWKHFRUHRIWKHQRYHO¶VWUDJHG\6WHLQOLJKWIRFXVVHV 
primarily on the MalthuVLDQGLPHQVLRQVRIWKHQRYHO¶VVWDWLVWLFDOWKLQNLQJJULPO\FDSWXUHGin 
 )DWKHU7LPH¶VVXLFLGHQRWH³done because we DUHWRRPHQQ\´%XWWKHSUREOHPRI³too 
mHQQ\´ is not just a matter of overpopulation and the supposedly excessive fertility of the 
poor.  It is an effect of mass education and the logic of the scholarship ladder. As is often 
noted, education can be conceptualised as a positional or competitive good; that is, it is a 
good whose value depends on its social distribution (Howell 2011, 19). $V-XGH¶VIDQWDVLHVRI
Christminster make vivid, university education derived its quasi-sacral, quasi-aristocratic 
mystique in the Victorian age from its relative social scarcity. Toward the end of the novel, 
Jude laments that he could not benefit from new schemes to render university less 
³H[FOXVLYH´, but the exclusivity of Oxford is the essence of its attraction for him. 
Indeed, increased social mobility and mass HGXFDWLRQSRVHDWKUHDWWR-XGH¶VIDQWDV\OLIH
crowding it with a horde of anonymous men with WKHVDPHDVSLUDWLRQV³He sometimes felt 
that by caring for books he was not escaping common-place nor gaining rare ideas, every 
working-man being of that taste QRZ´. Although Jude espouVHV³HTXDOLW\RI
RSSRUWXQLW\´, he does not in fact want a more egalitarian education system, but to enjoy 
WKHVHQVHRIVSLULWXDO³HOHFWLRQ´SRVVLEOH within the existing elitist one (113). At the same 
time, Jude has no faith that he is exceptional. As he feels keenly, it is not enough that he be 
extremely diligent or passionate about books; in order to be a poor boy deemed worthy of 
Oxford, he must be a statLVWLFDODQGELRORJLFDORXWOLHULQSRVVHVVLRQRIUDUH³QDWXUDODELOLW\´
-XGH¶VDPELWLRQLVWKXVSHUIHFWO\VHOI-defeating, or a form of cruel optimism, in Lauren 
%HUODQW¶VLQIOXHQWLDOIRUPXODWLRQ (1-22). It is not simply that he has an unrealistic dream of 
attending an elite institution; his own exclusion is constitutive of what he desires, insofar as 
the glamour of Oxford inheres in the fact that it is a ³FDVWOH manned by scholarship and 
UHOLJLRQ´DJDLQVWWKH³WRRPHQQ\´, the democratic mass from which he has no means of 
distinguishing himself. 
Jude falls in love with Sue because she appears to incarnate and thereby to resolve his 
 contradictory intellectual ideals. Firstly, he fancies that she embodies the kind of 
³GLVLQWHUHVWHG´³HWKHUHDO´ brilliance that he identifies with Oxford (187). Indeed, he imagines 
her intelligence just as he imagines the university, as a radiant fact of nature: he says that her 
intellect ³VFLQWLOODWHVOLNHDVWDU´(342) RUSOD\VOLNH³ODPEHQWOLJKWQLQJ´ (344) (this is a 
perception of Sue shared by -XGH¶VULYDOWKHVFKRROWHDFKHUMr. Phillotson: he remarks that 
6XH¶VLQWHOOHFW³sparkles like diamonds, while mine sPRXOGHUVOLNHEURZQSDSHU´)). 
Secondly, Sue is also the meritocratic success story that Jude is not, even if her aspirations 
are more modest than his: she expects WR³SDVVKLJK´ in her examinations and duly wins 
D4XHHQ¶VVFKRODUVKLSWRDWtend teacher training college. Third, where Jude seems to 
experience only WKHDOLHQDWLRQDQG³SORGGLQJ´ of autodidacticism, Sue exemplifies what an 
intellect can achieve by ZRUNLQJRXWVLGHRI³RUGDLQHGOLQHV´: when Jude first 
encounters her, he is startled by her intellectual audacity, and she introduces him to the 
possibility that education might be experienced not as religious transcendence but as a pagan 
pleasure and liberation, an idea captured in KHUSHQFKDQWIRUTXRWLQJ$&6ZLQEXUQH¶V 
poetry (150). Sue seems empowered by her very oppression: her gender means she is not 
prey to same illusions about Oxford as Jude, and her mLQGLVWKXVIUHHUWR³SOD\´DPRQJ
³FRQYHQWLRQVDQGIRUPDOLWLHV´. In contrast to him, she flippantly asserts her own 
mastery of Latin and Greek grammar and her wide reading of classical authors in translation, 
announcing WKDWVKHKDVQR³fear of PHQDVVXFKQRURIWKHLUERRNV´. If Jude suggests 
the extent to which the autodidactic intellect may be stultified by a sense of inferiority, then 
Sue at least initially seems to exemplify what an emancipated intellect might look like: in 
5DQFLqUH¶Vterms, she suggests ³what an intelligence can do when it considers itself equal to 
any other and consLGHUVDQ\RWKHUHTXDOWRLWVHOI´Ignorant Schoolmaster 39). 
+DUG\¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI6XH¶VLQWHOOLJHQFHFRQGHQVHVWKHVDPHSROLtical ambiguities 
DVKLVGHSLFWLRQRI-XGH¶VLQVRIar as it we are invited to interpret it by turns as a product of 
 education and as an effect of biological determinism. On the one hand, the narrative 
KLJKOLJKWVWKDW6XH¶VLQWHOOHFWXDOLVPLVLPSUHVVLYHbecause it is largely her own creation: it is 
a product of her adventurous reading programme, which has in turn fed her ³9ROWDLUHDQ´
(152) scepticism LQWKHIDFHRIVRFLDORUWKRGR[LHV7RWKLVH[WHQW6XH¶VLQWHOOHFWis her 
³advanced´ theories, her feminism and atheism (166)2QWKHRWKHU6XH¶VLQWHOOHFWLV
biologised insofar as she is persistently characterised as neurasthenic. Both before and after 
WKHFDODPLW\RIKHUFKLOGUHQ¶VGHDWKVVKHLVGHILQHGE\KHU³WLJKW-VWUDLQHGQHUYHV´ (110), and 
this pathologising discourse has multiple significations. Neurasthenia, or nervous exhaustion, 
was considered a typically feminine malady and sometimes linked specifically to the cultural 
stereotype of New Woman, particularly in her incarnation as thH³H[DPJLUO´ who had 
depleted her mentaOFDSDFLWLHVWKURXJKH[FHVVLYH³FUDPPLQJ´*UHHQVODGH-137). But 
neurasthenia also carried a distinct intellectual prestige insofar as it was understood as an 
illness of modernity and a mark of high intelligence. The Romantic identification of madness 
with creative genius gained scientific authority at the fin de siècle, with a flurry of books 
claiming that modern brain science confirmed the poetic archetype.xx :KHWKHUWKHQRYHO¶V
HPSKDVLVXSRQ6XH¶V³QHUYHV´ amounts to a sexist denigration of her intellect or serves to 
lend her some of the quasi-medical glamour of fin de siècle genius is open to dispute: 
+DUG\¶VFRQVWUXFWLRQRIKHUUHDGLO\HYRNHVERWKFOLFKpV+DUG\DOVROHDYHVRSHQWKHTXHVWLRQ
of whether 6XH¶VQHXrasthenia is a cause or effect of her intellectual rebelliousness, and thus 
the question of whether the pathology resides primarily in her or in the social order she rebels 
DJDLQVW+RZHYHULWLV6XH¶VJHQGHURUUDWKHUKHUGHSDUWXUHIURPWKHQRUPVRIKHU gender, 
WKDWLQVSLUHVWKHQRYHO¶V most categorical affirmation of biological determinism. It appears 
when the narrator describes the other ZRPHQDW6XH¶VWHDFKHUWUDLQLQJFROOHJH 
 
[«] they all lay in their cubicles, their tender feminine faces upturned [«] down the 
 ORQJGRUPLWRULHVHYHU\IDFHEHDULQJWKHOHJHQGµ7KH:HDNHU¶XSRQLWDVWKHSHQDOW\
of the sex wherein they were moulded, which by no possible exertion of their willing 
hearts and abilities could be made strong while the inexorable laws of nature remain 
ZKDWWKH\DUH>«@$PLGWKHVWRUPVDQGVWUDLQVRIDIWHU-years, with their injustice, 
loneliness, child-bearing and bereavement, their minds would revert to this experience 
as to something which had been allowed to slip past them insufficiently regarded. 
(140-141) 
 
 It is signLILFDQWWKDW+DUG\LQYRNHVWKH³LQH[RUDEOHODZVRIQDWXUH´in relation to a 
group of trainee teachers: is the hopes these women have invested in the transformative 
power of education that makes WKHELRORJLFDOOLPLWVRIWKHLU³DELOLWLHV´ so pathetically stark. 
7KHSDWKRVRIWKHLUERQGDJHLVVRPHZKDWFUXGHO\DPSOLILHGE\WKHQDUUDWRU¶Vabrupt prolepsis: 
their education will be ineffectual, a faintly felt interlude in lives made predictable and 
homogeneous by biology. Yet part of the purpose of this passage is to highlight the rebellious 
individualism of Sue, who has escaped from the dormitory to visit Jude and, the narrator 
implies, is simultaneously attempting to escape from her biological destiny. If Sue does not in 
fact manage to avoid the stock fate of women, the text never attributes this to any weakness 
of her mental abilities-XGH¶VVHQVHRIDZHDW6XH¶VLQWHOOHFWHYHQLQLWVUXLQHGVWDWHLVQHYHU
contradicted or undercut by the narrator. 
The character of Arabella Donn is the most fraught expression of WKHQRYHO¶V 
ambivalence toward the late Victorian biopolitics of mental capacity. Superficially, she is a 
grotesque manifestation of the Social DarwinisWPRGHORILQWHOOLJHQFHDSLJIDUPHU¶V
daughter who is herself depicted as bestial throughouWWKHQRYHOKHU³FOHYHU>QHVV@´401) is 
all animal instinct and ruthless self-interest. At the level of plot, Arabella is the principle of 
SOHEHLDQFDUQDOLW\ZKLFKFRQWLQXDOO\GLVUXSWV-XGH¶Vbildungsroman and spoils his rarefied 
 ideals, whether she LVKXUOLQJDSLJ¶VSHQLVDWKLPE\ZD\RIVHGXFWLRQRU wiping lard on his 
books. :LWKLQWKHWHUPVRIWKHQRYHO¶VEOHDNWUDQVYDOXDWLRQRI6RFLDO'DUZLQLVP$UDEHOODLV
unredeemable because of her resilience and joie de vivre; as epitomised by her callousness in 
WKHZDNHRI-XGH¶VGHDWKWKHZLOOWRVXUYLYHDQGEHKDSS\FDQRQO\FRPHDWWKHSULFHRIRQH¶V
KXPDQLW\LQWKHPRUDOXQLYHUVHRIWKLVQRYHO%\WKHVDPHORJLF-XGH¶VDQG6XH¶VGHVSDLURI
life proves that they are ArabeOOD¶VPRUDODQGLQWHOOHFWXDOVXSHULRUVWKHLUIDLOXUHWRIORXULVKLQ
the world ² what Galton or Maudsley would identify as their ³GHJHQHUDF\´²  confirms 
their finer humanity, their shared status as beautiful souls. Yet this reading overlooks the 
extent to ZKLFKWKHQRYHOLVRI$UDEHOOD¶VSDUW\$UDEHOOD¶VFRQWHPSWIRU-XGH¶V ³KLJKHU´
DVSLUDWLRQVDFFRUGVZLWKWKHQRYHO¶VZLGHUDWWDFNRQHFRQRPLFDQGHGXFDWLRQal inequality. In 
KHUXQDVKDPHGYXOJDULW\$UDEHOODDFWXDOO\OLYHVRXW-XGHDQG6XH¶VUDGLFDOSROLWLcal ideals: 
she demonstrates the indifference to religion, sexual propriety, and class distinctions that they 
associate with enlightenment. More, she enacts the hedonistic naturalism that Sue can only 
theorise and yearn for: ³1DWXUH¶VLQWHQWLRQ1DWXUH¶VOaw and UDLVRQG¶rWUH[is] that we should 
EHMR\IXOLQZKDWLQVWLQFWVVKHDIIRUGHGXV´.  5HDGHUVZKRH[SHULHQFHDQ³LOOLFLW´
sympathy with Arabella are not reading against the grain of the novel, but registering the 
extent to which she is allied with its politics, specifically its desire to vindicate the claims of 
the poor and the material realities of the body.xxi  
+DUG\¶V critique of late Victorian hierarchies of the mind is distilled in the graffiti that 
Jude scrawls in chalk on a wall in Oxford, a qXRWDWLRQIURPWKH%RRNRI-RE³I have 
understanding as well as you; I am not inferior to you: yea, who knoweth not such things as 
WKHVH"´ ([Job 12.3],118). Jude is reacting to a patronising rebuff from tKH³0DVWHURI%LEOLROO
&ROOHJH´and the walls of Oxford at this moment symbolise the impassable barriers to his 
intellectual aspirations (117). The fact that Jude derives his assertion of the equality of human 
intelligence from the Book of Job is rich with significance. The Book of Job has often been 
 understood as the subversive book of the Hebrew Bible: -RE¶VGHVSDLULQJLQWHUURJDWLRQRIthe 
QDWXUHRI*RG¶VMXVWLFHLVRSHQWREHLQJUHDGDVDQarchetype of religious doubt or political 
insubordination.xxii  Jude clearly invokes Job as a Biblical exemplar of a type of despair 
which radicalises the intellect and arouses righteous protest; in effect, he is countering the 
Oxford conflation of learning, religion, and privilege with his own identification of 
intellectual value with scepticism and suffering. However, the choice of quotation 
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\XQGHUFXWVWKHVXJJHVWLRQWKDWVXIIHULQJSURGXFHVVSHFLDOLQVLJKW-XGH¶V
ZLVGRPOLNH-RE¶VLVERWKWKHSULYLOHJHRIKLVYLFWLPKRRGDQGEDQDODQ\ERG\¶VNQRZOHGJH: 
³who knowetKQRWVXFKWKLQJVDVWKHVH"´ In this way, Jude grounds intellectual value in 
WUDJLFVXIIHULQJZKLOHDOVRHPSKDVLVLQJWUDJHG\¶VHJDOLWDULDQLVPxxiii The fact that Jude finds 
authorisation for his act of iconoclasm in the Bible means that the graffiti also resonates as a 
pithy immanent critique of Oxford, which, as a Christian institution, purported to recognise 
the spiritual claims of the poor and outFDVW,QFRQWH[W-XGH¶VDSSURSULDWLRQRI-RE¶VTXHVWLRQ
accuses Oxford of possessing no recondite wisdom, of being founded upon the banality of 
social inequality ² a truth that can be discerned as readily from outside its walls as from 




Adrian Wooldridge remarks that WKHLGHDRIQDWXUDOHTXDOLW\RUDQ\³URRW-and-branch 
HJDOLWDULDQLVP´ ZDVPDUJLQDOLVHGIRUDOPRVWDFHQWXU\DIWHUWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI'DUZLQ¶V On 
the Origin of Species´ (Wooldridge 2006, 295). As has been noted, around the turn of the 
century it became a cliché for scientists and intellectuals to denounce the stupidity of the 
doctrine of natural equality, particularly the notion that ³men are born with equal original 
PHQWDOFDSDFLW\´ (Maudsley, 43). Yet the fact that it was necessary to debunk the idea 
 suggests its persistent cultural vitality. Science had apparently made human equality 
unthinkable in the same decades that the Third Reform Act (1884), the birth of state 
education, and growth of the socialist movement incited people to think it: indeed, it was 
bHFDXVH+X[OH\EHOLHYHGWKDWWKHLGHDORI³QDWXUDOHTXDOLW\´was ZRUNLQJ³VDGPLVFKLHI´ in 
the present that he felt compelled to attack the legacy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (4).  
When Rancière recuperates the idea of the equality of intelligence from the 
Rousseauist Jacotot, he constructs it not as a sober thesis for which he can supply evidence 
but as a kind of dare or wager, an invitation to an intellectual ³DGYHQWXUH´XSRQZKLFKZH
RXJKWWR³JDPEOHDOO>RXU@FUHGLELOLW\´ (Ignorant Schoolmaster 27, 68). He writes: 
  
WKHSUREOHPLVQ¶WSURYLQJWKDWDOOLQWHOOLJHQFHLVHTXDO,W¶VVHHLQJZKDWFDQEHGRQH
under that supposition. And for this, it is enough that the opinion be possible ² that 
is, that no opposing truth be proved. (Ignorant Schoolmaster 46). 
 
In one sense, the notion of the equality of human intelligence has only a marginal or 
tragic OLIHLQ+DUG\¶VILQDOQRYHOVLWLVDFULWLTXHSODFHGLQWKHPRXWKRI*UDPPHU2OLYHU
in The Woodlanders or a Bible quote graffitied on a wall in Jude. Yet in another, the principle 
is ubiquitous: at every turn, these novels are efforts to count the uncounted intelligences of 
servants, agricultural laboUHUVSLJIDUPHU¶VGDXJKWHUVSwinburne-quoting pupil-teachers and 
autodidact stonemasons. As Rancière emphasises, this is not a matter of idealising manual 
labor or the wisdom of the poor, but of annulling the distinction between elite and common 
minds, and making it impossible to imagine that there DUHSHRSOH³UHDOO\made for higher 
WKLQJV´ and people only made for ³dumb suffering´.  
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 See Darwin 2004, 46. I cite these psychologists because we know Hardy was familiar with 
their work; see Keen, 17-52. On the hereditary nature of intellectual ability, see Maudsley 
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viii
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the course of the nineteenth century, see Frederickson. 
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in passing (2). Like Steinlight, she is thinking primarLO\RIWKHQRYHO¶VDSSDUHQWFRPSOLFLW\
with the Malthusian logic RI)DWKHU7LPH¶Vsuicide note.  
xiii
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theory in Jude, see Steinlight, 229-231. 
xix
 See Ingham, 170-174. 
xx
 See Stiles, 126-133. 
                                                     




 See Dell.  
xxiii
  Eagleton observes that the aristocratic genre of tragedy is democratised in modern 
OLWHUDWXUHWKH³MHDORXVO\SDWUROOHGIURQWLHUVEHWZHHQWUDJLFUHJLVWHUVDQGQRQ-WUDJLFYLFWLPV´
break down and anyone can be a tragic subject (95).  
